TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO THE UNITED STATES DESIGNATED/ELECTED OFFICE (DO/EO/US) CONCERNING A FILING UNDER 35 USC 371	ATTORNEY'S DOCKET NUMBER ASCOP039USNP
	US APPLICATION NO. (if known) 09/297784

INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION NO. PCT/US97/15856	INTERNATIONAL FILING DATE NOVEMBER 7, 1997	PRIORITY DATE CLAIMED NOVEMBER 7, 1996

TITLE OF INVENTION
System for Protecting Cryptographic Processing and Memory Resources for Postal Franking Machines

APPLICANT(S) FOR DO/EO/US
G. Schwartz, et al..

Applicant herewith submits to the United States Designated/Elected Office (DO/EO/US) the following items and other information:

1. (X) This is a **FIRST** submission of items concerning a filing under 35 USC 371.
2. ( ) This is a **SECOND** or **SUBSEQUENT** submission of items concerning a filing under 35 USC 371.
3. ( ) This express request to begin the national examination procedures (35 USC 371(f)) at any time rather than delay examination until the expiration of the applicable time limit set in 35 USC 371(b) and PCT Articles 22 and 39(1).
4. ( ) A proper Demand for International Preliminary Examination was made by the 19th month from the earliest claimed priority.
5. (X) A copy of the International Application as filed (35 USC 371(c)(2)
    a. ( ) is transmitted herewith (required only if not transmitted by the International Bureau)
    b. (X) has been transmitted by the International Bureau.
    c. (X) is not required, as the application was filed with the United States Receiving Office (RO/US).
6. ( ) A translation of the International Application into English (35 USC 371(c)(2).
7. (X) Amendments to the claims of the International Application under PCT Article 19 (35 USC 371(c)(3)
    a. ( ) are transmitted herewith (required only if not transmitted by the International Bureau).
    b. ( ) have been transmitted by the International Bureau.
    c. ( ) have not been made, however the time limit for making such amendments has NOT expired.
    d. (X) have not been made and will not be made.
8. ( ) A translation of the amendments to the claims under PCT Article 19 (35 USC 371(c)(3)).
9. ( ) An oath or declaration of the inventor(s) (35 USC 371(c)(4)). **unsigned**
10. ( ) A translation of the Annexes to the International Preliminary Examination report under PCT Article 36 (35 USC 371(c)(5).

Items 11. to 16. below concern other document(s) of information included:

11. (X) An Information Disclosure Statement under 37 CFR 1.97 and 1.98.
12. ( ) An Assignment document for recording. A separate cover sheet in compliance with 37 CFR 3.28 and 3.31 is included.
13. ( ) A FIRST preliminary amendment.
    ( ) A SECOND or SUBSEQUENT preliminary amendment.
14. ( ) A substitute specification.
15. ( ) A change or power of attorney and/or address letter.
16. ( ) Other items or information. Published PCT Application; International Search Report

EL139151256US

US APPLICATION NO. (if known)	INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION NO. PCT/US97/15856	ATTORNEY'S DOCKET NO. ASCOP039USNP

17. (X) The following fees are submitted
Basic National Fee (37 CFR 1.492(a)(1)-(5):

	CALCULATIONS	PTO USE ONLY

Search Report has been prepared by EPO or JPO... $840.00

International preliminary examination fee paid to USPTO (37CFR 1.482) but all claims did not satisfy provisions of PCT Article 33(1)-(4) $670.00

No international preliminary examination fee paid to USPTO (37 CFR 1.482) but international search fee paid to USPTO (37 CFR 1.445(a)(2)).. $760.00

Neither international preliminary examination fee (37 CFR 1.482) nor international search fee (37 CFR 1.445(a)(2) paid to USPTO and International Search Report not prepared by the EPO or JPO.. $970.00

International preliminary examination fee paid to USPTO (37 CFR 1.482) and all claims satisfied provisions of PCT Article 33(2)-(4).. $ 96.00

ENTER APPROPRIATE BASIC FEE AMOUNT = **$ 670.00**

Surcharge of $ 130.00 for furnishing the oath or declaration later than ( ) 20 ( ) 30 months from the earliest claimed priority date (37 CFR 1.492(e))

Claims	Number Filed	Number Extra	Rate		
Total Claims	11 -20=	0	X $18.00	**$0**	
Independent Claims	11 - 3=	8	X $78.00	**$624.00**	
Multiple dependent claim(s) if applicable			+ $260.00		
TOTAL OF ABOVE CALCULATIONS =				**$1294.00**	

Reduction by 1/2 for filing by small entity, if applicable, Verified Small Entity Statement must also be filed. (Note 37 CFR 1.9, 1.27 and 1.28)   -   **$**

SUBTOTAL = **$1294.00**

Processing fee of $130.00 for furnishing English translation later than ( ) 20 ( ) 30 months from the earliest claimed priority date (37 CFR 1.492(f).   +   **$**

TOTAL NATIONAL FEE = **$1294.00**

Fee for recording the enclosed assignment (37 CFR 1.21(h)). The assignment must be accompanied by an appropriate cover sheet (37 CFR 3.28, 3.31) $40 per property +   **$**

TOTAL FEES ENCLOSED = **$1294.00**

	Amount to be refunded	$
	charged	$

a. (X)   A check in the amount of $ <u>1294.00</u> to cover the fee above is enclosed.
b. ( )   Please charge my Deposit Account No. 15-0610 in the amount of $_____ to cover the above fees. A duplicate copy of this sheet is enclosed.
c. (X)   The Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any additional fees which may be required or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. **15-0610**. A duplicate copy of this sheet is enclosed.

NOTE: Where an appropriate time limit under 37 CFR 1.494 or 1.495 has not been met, a petition to revive (37 CFR 1.137(a) or (b)) must be filed and granted to restore the application to pending status.
Send All Correspondence To:

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P.O. Box 5270
Frisco, CO 80443-5270

Signature

<u>Carl Oppedahl</u>
Name
<u>32,746</u>
Registration Number

SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESSING AND MEMORY RESOURCES FOR POSTAL FRANKING MACHINES

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority from pending U.S.
5   Provisional Application Serial Nos. 60/030,537,
60/050,043, and 60/054,105, filed on November 7, 1996,
June 18, 1997, and July 29, 1997, respectively, which are
hereby incorporated by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

10   This invention is directed to a system for
protecting cryptographic processing and memory resources
for postal franking machines.

BACKGROUND ART

In countries throughout the world, a postal
15   customer may obtain postage from the postal authority in
several ways, including the purchase of stamps and the
use of a postage meter. When a postage meter is used,
there is a security concern since the meter is dispensing
value, and without sufficient security, the value could
20   be stolen from a meter by unscrupulous parties. Concerns
include use of the meter to dispense postage for which
the Postal Authority has not been compensated and use of
the meter which was not authorized by the lawful operator
of the meter.

25   These security concerns have always been
present, even when a postage meter was essentially a
purely mechanical letterpress. As the postage meter
evolved through the 20th century to an electronic
configuration, letter-press printing was represented in a
30   rotary drum movement impressing an image onto a

mailpiece, as well as a flat-bed approach meshing a
mailpiece on a platen assembly against a printing die to
produce an image onto a mailpiece. The postage meter is
now taking on a new role of digitally printing postage,
5   thus no longer requiring letter-press printing.

When a postage meter utilizes letter-press
printing, security concerns are typically addressed, in
part, by the physical attributes of the meter. Not only
do the attributes of the meter (case material, etc.)
10 provide protection against the unauthorized use of the
meter, the attributes also provide a means to detect
whether an attempt has been made to make unauthorized use
of the meter evidenced by visible deliberate damage to
the meter's case. With evolution of the "meter," greater
15 security against fraudulent attacks on the meter is
needed. With the increase in the availability of
elaborate technologies and sophisticated hacking
capabilities, Postal Authorities around the world,
including the United States Postal Service, are concerned
20 with the ability to defraud the Postal Authorities by
falsifying postal indicium, particularly when such
indicium is digitally printed.

One approach which as been taken to increase
the security of evolved meters is to employ
25 cryptographics to the creation and application of the
postal indicia. In order for this approach to be an
effective security measure, however, there must be
sufficient physical security for the cryptographic
processing and memory to eliminate a successful
30 fraudulent attack on the system. In order for this to be
a commercially viable approach, cryptographic processing
must be performed in a timely manner.

DISCLOSURE OF THE INVENTION

In accordance with the present invention, there
is provided a greatly improved system for protecting
cryptographic processing and memory, which also results
5   in faster cryptographic processing. According to the
invention, it is provided that the appropriate
cryptographic processing and memory resources are
contained in a Postal Security Device (PSD). The PSD
provides physical security to these resources, thereby
10   eliminating a successful fraudulent attack on the system.
The PSD may be in the form of an Applications Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and is preferably mounted on a
portable device with an interface such as a Personal
Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA)
15   Compliant Card or other form factor capable of supporting
the integrity of the PSD.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

Fig. 1 is a block diagram showing the basic
functional makeup of the PSD cryptographic processor in
20   the present invention.

Fig. 2 is a block diagram of the PCMCIA Card
PSD of the present invention.

Fig. 3 is a block diagram showing the PSD of
the present invention operating in secure high speed
25   instruction cache operation.

MODES FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

Referring to Fig. 1, an ASIC embodiment of a
PSD is shown generally at 5 and includes zeroing
circuitry 10, read-only-memory 12, random-access-memory
30   14, switching/control logic 16, a control cryptographic

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processor 18, non-volatile memory 20, crypto key
retention 22, signature algorithm execution 24, random
number generator 26, real time clock 28, interrupt
control and porting 30, clock circuit 36, secure hash
5   acceleration circuit 44, secure memory management unit
54, and host interface 44 all within a cryptographic
boundary 34. The Random Number Generator 26 within this
block provides a source for non-predictable random
numbers typically required in systems employing
10 cryptographic technology. The clock circuit 28 is an on-
chip realtime clock for secure time keeping. External to
the ASIC PSD are a battery 32 for retaining memory
contents in the absence of main power to the ASIC, and
one or more crystals 37 which provide clock reference
15 timing for the various subcircuits within the ASIC. Such
a PSD contains working memory, storage memory, and
firmware necessary to execute cryptographic algorithms,
within its cryptographic boundary, including, but not
limited to DES and RSA encryption, as well as digital
20 signature creation and validation. Information that must
be retained, as Master Key, Public Key, Private Key, and
the like are secured within a non-volatile memory or
battery backed up memory of the PSD. Although the battery
and crystals are outside the cryptographic boundary of
25 the ASIC in this embodiment, these components can be also
integrated into the same package as the ASIC silicon die.

The ASIC provides physical security to the data
stored thereon as the circuits are inaccessible without
destroying circuit operation. The secure data stored on
30 an ASIC includes data encryption keys which cannot be
extracted or modified without destroying PSD operation.
The encryption engine 24 includes the capability of
receiving data, processing the received data by
performing encryption or decryption operations.

5

The individual components of the ASIC may also
be integrated within a PCMCIA Card, or preferably the
custom integrated circuit (ASIC) is further integrated
and embodied as a PCMCIA Card. The PCMCIA Card provides
5   additional physical security through its housing for the
processing unit for the storage and accounting of all
funds, audit and secure support data required to produce
and validate the addition and removal of postage value.
As described above, one of the preferred embodiments
10   encloses the ASIC or it components in a PCMCIA card.
More generally, the invention contemplates enclosing the
ASIC or its components in any package having a relatively
small form factor. For example, any form factor that is
more or less pocket-sized or that is more or less capable
15   of being mailed in an envelope will be convenient. Such
a package must necessarily have a communications port
capable to interfacing with the postal franking device
and a host, discussed below, preferably a parallel data
and address bus such as is employed in a PCMCIA card.
20   Alternatively the port could be a serial bus such as a
high-speed universal serial bus. If the application does
not require high speed, an infrared (LED-phototransistor)
link may be used. Said secure processing unit contains
working memory, storage memory, and firmware necessary to
25   execute cryptographic algorithms, within a cryptographic
boundary, including but not limited to DES and RSA, as
well as digital signature creation and validation.
Information which must be retained, such as Master Keys,
Public Keys, Private Keys, and the like are secured
30   within a non-volatile memory or battery backed up memory.

The security of the PSD implemented in a PCMCIA
Card is a combination of data integrity, authentication,
non-repudiation, and confidentiality. `Data integrity is
realized through the use of cryptographic checksums (one-
35   way hashes) over the data. This function produces a

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small value that uniquely represents the data, such that
if any single bit is altered the hash value changes
significantly. The digital signature is obtained by
performing a cryptographic operation on the resultant

5   hash of the data. Authentication is realized by the fact
that the receiving party can verify the digital signature
on a transmission and be assured the transmission was
originated by a trusted source and not other fraudulent
parties. Non-repudiation is achieved by the fact that

10   the originator of the message cannot deny the message
contents as it is possible to generate the verifiable
digital signature only with the originator's unique
private key. Confidentiality is the use of encryption to
protect the data from unauthorized disclosure.

15   To ensure operational security, the PSD cannot
operate as a standalone device and requires a host system
to perform its functions. The PSD typically communicates
directly with a host system to carry out its primary
objective of indicia creation. Additionally, through the

20   host system a user can access the PSD to review the
ascending and descending register values, piece count,
watchdog timeout date, and refill history logs; activate
PSD diagnostics; and with proper supervisor
authorization, set up and delete PINs for individual

25   users. The PSD may also provide the user with certain
operational error messages such as a low-postage warning
and watchdog timeout condition through the host user
interface. The host system may also maintain certain log
files; these log files are required to be signed by the

30   PSD with its private key. The host system will transfer
the data to sign to the PSD and the PSD will return a
digital signature and a certificate (which contains the
public key which is unique to the PSD) that can be used
later to verify the digital signature.

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The PSD supports input and output functions with appropriate interfacing devices compatible with the PSD physical, link layer, and application protocols. Due to the secure nature of the PSD, the device does not

5   provide user accessible diagnostic features. Rather, the PSD has an extensive built-in self test suite which is run upon power up. The tests preferably include the normal code memory verification tests, RAM tests, verification of accounting register and data log

10 integrity, and execution of sample cryptographic calculations with known results to verify full functionality of the PSD. Upon successful completion of these tests, the PSD will be enabled to dispense postage funds. If any of the tests fail, the PSD will output its

15 current ascending register and descending values. The host may also obtain the same information via a device audit request message. This will provide the host with additional information which may be forwarded to a Host infrastructure for the purposes of auditing the PSD.

20 Upon the receipt and verification of a Host infrastructure-generated device audit message, preferably the PSD will reset its internal watchdog timer to accommodate control and transaction date information.

It is understood by one skilled in the art that

25 the PSD of the present invention need not be physically located with the postal franking device; it only need be in communication with the postal franking device. For example, it may be located on the host or a computer network. In the instance of the PSD including a PCMCIA

30 Card, the PSD may be connected to the franking device for operation and then disconnected and connected to the host for creation of the log files, etc., through a standard PCMCIA slot.

Referring now to Fig. 2, a block diagram of the
embodiment of the PCMCIA Card PSD of the present
invention interfacing with a host controller is shown,
including host controller 64, timeout circuit 66, memory

5   arbiter 68, controller 70, and memory 72. It is
envisioned that a number of forms of attack can be
executed against the PCMCIA Card PSD wherein an attacker
attempts to obtain additional data from the PSD, or
otherwise compromise its integrity, by holding the bus

10   for an excessive period of time. Timeout circuit 66
operates to limit the amount of time host controller 64
may have to complete a bus transaction, and will
terminate a host-initiated bus transaction if the
transaction exceeds a predetermined time limit.

15   When host 64 wishes to access the PSD
implemented in a PCMCIA Card, it waits until read signal
74 is asserted and then asserts select signal 76. This
signal is input to timeout circuit 66, which initiates a
predetermined timeout interval. Host controller 64 then

20   initiates a read or write cycle by asserting the
appropriate read and write signals and setting up the
address and data busses accordingly.

Timeout circuit 66 provides a separate select
signal 78 to memory arbiter 68, which is effectively a

25   dual port memory controller containing logic which
defines conditions under which controller 70 and host
controller 64 have access to memory 72. When host
controller 64 has access to memory 72, arbiter 68 asserts
a hold signal 80 to controller 70, which tells controller

30   70 to temporarily hold off any further accesses of memory
72. Under these circumstances, controller 70 is
typically idle unless it is performing an internal
operation not requiring an external memory access.

Arbiter 68 allows read and write signals 82 and 84, as well as address and data busses 86 and 88, to pass onto memory 72. Following a successful bus transaction, host controller 64 deasserts select signal 74 to timeout
5   circuit 66 to indicate the normal end of the bus transfer. Timeout circuit 66 likewise deasserts select signal 78 to arbiter 68, which removes host controller's signal levels on the read, write, address and data busses (82, 84, and 86) to memory 72 and signals the controller
10   70 that it can access memory 72 by deasserting hold signal 80.

If host controller 64 takes too long to complete the bus access, timeout circuit 66 deasserts ready signal 74 to the host controller and select signal
15   78 to arbiter 68. This causes arbiter 68 to remove host controller's 64 read (84), write (82) address (88) and data (86) signals from memory 72. Hold signal 80 to controller 70 is released to controller 70 can again access memory 72. Alternatively, timeout circuit 66
20   could also signal controller 70 that the fault occurred by asserting interrupt signal 90 to that device. Logic in the controller 70's software could be invoked to categorize the problem as a random fault or an attempt to compromise the PSD. If controller 70 determines
25   tampering has been attempted, the controller would refuse further host controller 64 accesses and force the customer to report the situation to the manufacturer, for example, remotely through a telephone call or other network communication or by returning the device.

30   A preferred embodiment of the PSD implemented on a PCMCIA Card would restrict the area in memory 72 that host controller 64 can access. For example, access can be limited to no access, read-only, write-only, read-write, etc., and the address range in memory 72 can be

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restricted to a subset available to controller 70. In
this manner, controller 70 can hide certain information,
such as its most critical security parameters, from both
observation or overwriting.

5   Host interface 42 incorporates timeout circuit
66, PCMCIA memory arbiter 68, and PSD controller 70.
Controller 70 corresponds to crypto processor 18 in
figure 1. Timeout circuit 66 and arbiter 68 would thus
preferably be incorporated into the PSD ASIC but may be
10   added as discrete circuits on the PCMCIA card.

The PSD of the present invention may be used
with existing public/private key cryptographical
techniques known in the art. See, for example, U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,237,506, 5,606,507 and 5,666,284, which are
15   hereby incorporated by reference. The speed with which
such encryption is performed, however, may be increased
by the use within the PSD of a Secure Memory Management
Unit 96 (SMMU). Preferably, this is obtained from Atalla
Corp., of San Jose, California, which is a Tandem
20   Company, and VLSI Technology, of San Jose, California.

As shown in Fig. 3, Memory 98 external to the
PSD contains encrypted code. SMMU 96 obtains the
encrypted code 100 in portions to be processed by
encryption engine 104, is such a manner that it acts as a
25   feed for encryption engine 104. The encryption engine
104 utilizes the appropriate decryption key provided to
it by the SMMU 96. This decryption key is securely
stored in the PSD ASIC and is never output and so is
never known to a potential attacker. The decrypted
30   output from encryption engine 104 is then placed into RAM
106 (also 14 in Fig. 1). Fig. 3 shows the output of RAM
106 going to processor 108 (also 18 in Fig. 1). Thus,
Fig. 3 depicts secure high speed instruction cache

operation.   The overall benefit of the SMMU is realized
by the fact that a would-be attacker cannot substitute
software instructions into the code to alter the intended
functionality and that could give the attacker access to
5   the master, private, or public keys held within the PSD
ASIC.

While there have been described what are
believed to be the preferred embodiments of the
invention, those skilled in the art will recognize that
10   other and further modifications may be made thereto
without departing from the invention and it is intended
to claim all such changes and modifications as fully
within the scope of the invention.

WE CLAIM:

1. A system for increasing the security and efficiency of cryptographic processing resources for postal franking machines, comprising:

5   (a) an encryption engine;

          (b) means for obtaining encrypted code in portions to be processed by the encryption engine;

          (c) random access memory;

10   (d) means for placing decrypted output from the encryption engine into the random access memory.

2. A method for increasing the security and efficiency of cryptographic processing resources for
15 postal franking machines, comprising:

          (a) obtaining encrypted code in portions to be processed by an encryption engine;

          (b) placing decrypted output from the encryption engine into random access memory.

20   3. A system for protecting cryptographic processing and memory resources for postal franking machines, comprising:

          (a) (1) zeroizing circuitry, (2) read only memory, (3) random access memory, (4) a
25   clock circuit, (5) non-volatile memory, (6) central cryptographic processor, (7) logic for addressing and data flow, (8)

crypto key retention, (9) signature
algorithm execution, (10) random number
generator, (11) interrupt control and
porting, (12) real time calendar
clocking and watch-dog timer, (13) hash
algorithm, (14) secure memory management
unit, and (15) host interface, all
disposed within a PCMCIA Card;

(b) means disposed within the PCMCIA Card
for monitoring the amount of time a host
controller is taking to complete a bus
transaction;

(c) means disposed within the PCMCIA Card
for comparing the monitored amount of
time to a predetermined reference time;

(d) means disposed within the PCMCIA Card
for refusing to permit completion of the
bus transaction if the monitored amount
of time exceeds the predetermined
reference time;

(e) an encryption engine disposed within
the PCMCIA Card;

(f) means for obtaining encrypted code in
portions to be processed by the
encryption engine;

(g) random access memory disposed within
the PCMCIA Card;

(h) means for placing decrypted output
from the encryption engine into the
random access memory.

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4. A system for protecting cryptographic processing and memory resources for postal franking machines, comprising:

(a) (1) zeroizing circuitry, (2) read only memory, (3) random access memory, (4) a clock circuit, (5) non-volatile memory, (6) central cryptographic processor, (7) logic for addressing and data flow, (8) crypto key retention, (9) signature algorithm execution, (10) random number generator, (11) interrupt control and porting, (12) real time calendar clocking and watch-dog timer, (13) hash algorithm, (14) secure memory management unit, and (15) host interface, all disposed within a PCMCIA Card;

(b) means disposed within the PCMCIA Card for monitoring the amount of time a host controller is taking to complete a bus transaction;

(c) means disposed within the PCMCIA Card for comparing the monitored amount of time to a predetermined reference time;

(d) means disposed within the PCMCIA Card for refusing to permit completion of the bus transaction if the monitored amount of time exceeds the predetermined reference time.

5. A system for protecting cryptographic processing and memory resources for postal franking machines, comprising an Application Specific Integrated

Circuit having (1) zeroizing circuitry, (2) read only
memory, (3) random access memory, (4) a clock circuit,
(5) non-volatile memory, (6) central cryptographic
processor, (7) logic for addressing and data flow, (8)
5   crypto key retention, (9) signature algorithm execution,
(10) random number generator, (11) interrupt control and
porting, (12) real time calendar clocking and watch-dog
timer, (13) hash algorithm, (14) secure memory management
unit, and (15) host interface.

10   6. A system for protecting cryptographic
processing and memory resources for postal franking
machines, comprising:

             (a) an Application Specific Integrated
                 Circuit having (1) zeroizing circuitry,
15   (2) read only memory, (3) random access
                 memory, (4) a clock circuit, (5) non-
                 volatile memory, (6) central cryptographic
                 processor, (7) logic for addressing and
                 data flow, (8) crypto key retention, (9)
20   signature algorithm execution, (10) random
                 number generator, (11) interrupt control
                 and porting, (12) real time calendar
                 clocking and watch-dog timer, (13) hash
                 algorithm, (14) secure memory management
25   unit, and (15) host interface;

             (b) said Application Specific Integrated
                 Circuit being disposed within a Personal
                 Computer Memory International Association
                 card.

30   7. A method for protecting cryptographic
processing and memory resources for postal franking
machines, comprising locating the resources to be

protected within an Application Specific Integrated
Circuit.

5   8. A system for protecting cryptographic
processing and memory resources for postal franking
machines, comprising (1) zeroizing circuitry, (2) read
only memory, (3) random access memory, (4) a clock
circuit, (5) non-volatile memory, (6) central
cryptographic processor, (7) logic for addressing and
data flow, (8) crypto key retention, (9) signature
10   algorithm execution, (10) random number generator, (11)
interrupt control and porting, (12) real time calendar
clocking and watch-dog timer, (13) hash algorithm, (14)
secure memory management unit, and (15) host interface,
all disposed within a PCMCIA Card.

15   9. A method for protecting cryptographic
processing and memory resources for postal franking
machines, comprising locating the resources to be
protected within a PCMCIA Card.

       10. A method for protecting cryptographic
20   processing and memory resources for postal franking
machines disposed within PCMCIA Card, comprising:

            (a) monitoring the amount of time a host
                controller is taking to complete a bus
                transaction;

25   (b) comparing the monitored amount of time to
                a predetermined reference time;

            (c) refusing to permit completion of the bus
                transaction if the monitored amount of
                time exceeds the predetermined reference
30   time.

11. A system for protecting cryptographic processing and memory resources for postal franking machines, comprising:

(a) an Application Specific Integrated Circuit having (1) zeroizing circuitry, (2) read only memory, (3) random access memory, (4) a clock circuit, (5) non-volatile memory, (6) central cryptographic processor, (7) logic for addressing and data flow, (8) crypto key retention, (9) signature algorithm execution, (10) random number generator, (11) interrupt control and porting, (12) real time calendar clocking and watch-dog timer, (13) hash algorithm, (14) secure memory management unit, and (15) host interface;

(b) an encryption engine disposed within the PCMCIA Card;

(c) means for obtaining encrypted code in portions to be processed by the encryption engine;

(d) random access memory disposed within the PCMCIA Card;

(e) means for placing decrypted output from the encryption engine into the random access memory.

1/3

FIG. 1

2/3

FIG. 2

3/3

FIG. 3

DECLARATION FOR UTILITY OR DESIGN PATENT APPLICATION (37 CFR 1.63)	Attorney Docket Number	ASCOP039
	First Named Inventor	SCHWARTZ
	COMPLETE IF KNOWN	
☐ Declaration Submitted with Initial Filing **OR** ☒ Declaration Submitted after Initial Filing (surcharge (37 CFR 1.16 (e)) required)	Application Number	09/297,784
	Filing Date	May 07, 1999
	Group Art Unit	
	Examiner Name	

As a below named inventor, I hereby declare that:

My residence, post office address, and citizenship are as stated below next to my name.

I believe I am the original, first and sole inventor (if only one name is listed below) or an original, first and joint inventor (if plural names are listed below) of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought on the invention entitled.

> SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESSING AND MEMORY RESOURCES FOR POSTAL FRANKING MACHINES

the specification of which   *(Title of the Invention)*

☐ is attached hereto

OR

☒ was filed on (MM/DD/YYYY) | 11/07/1997 | as United States Application Number or PCT International

Application Number US97/15856 and was amended on (MM/DD/YYYY) [   ] (if applicable).

I hereby state that I have reviewed and understand the contents of the above identified specification, including the claims, as amended by any amendment specifically referred to above.

I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR 1.56

I hereby claim foreign priority benefits under 35 U.S C. 119(a)-(d) or 365(b) of any foreign application(s) for patent or inventor's certificate, or 365(a) of any PCT international application which designated at least one country other than the United States of America, listed below and have also identified below, by checking the box, any foreign application for patent or inventor's certificate, or of any PCT international application having a filing date before that of the application on which priority is claimed.

Prior Foreign Application Number(s)	Country	Foreign Filing Date (MM/DD/YYYY)	Priority Not Claimed	Certified Copy Attached? YES	NO
			☐	☐	☐
			☐	☐	☐
			☐	☐	☐
			☐	☐	☐

☐ Additional foreign application numbers are listed on a supplemental priority data sheet PTO/SB/02B attached hereto:

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) of any United States provisional application(s) listed below.

Application Number(s)	Filing Date (MM/DD/YYYY)	
60/030,537	11/07/96	☐ Additional provisional application numbers are listed on a supplemental priority data sheet PTO/SB/02B attached hereto.
60/050,043	06/18/97	
60/054,105	07/29/97	

Please type a plus sign (+) inside this box → [+]

PTO/SB/01 (12-97)
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DECLARATION — Utility or Design Patent Application

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. 120 of any United States application(s), or 365(c) of any PCT international application designating the United States of America, listed below and, insofar as the subject matter of each of the claims of this application is not disclosed in the prior United States or PCT International application in the manner provided by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112, I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR 1.56 which became available between the filing date of the prior application and the national or PCT international filing date of this application.

U.S. Parent Application or PCT Parent Number	Parent Filing Date (MM/DD/YYYY)	Parent Patent Number (if applicable)

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As a named inventor, I hereby appoint the following registered practitioner(s) to prosecute this application and to tra and Trademark Office connected therewith: ☒ Customer Number [　　　　　] →

021121

OR

☐ Registered practitioner(s) name/registration number listed below

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Name	Registration Number	Name	Number

☐ Additional registered practitioner(s) named on supplemer **021121** tion sheet PTO/SB/02C attached hereto.

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Direct all correspondence to: ☒ Customer Number or Bar Code Label   OR ☐ Correspondence address below

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Country		Telephone		Fax

I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under 18 U.S.C. 1001 and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued thereon.

Name of Sole or First Inventor: ☐ A petition has been filed for this unsigned inventor

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☒ Additional inventors are being named on the _1_ supplemental Additional Inventor(s) sheet(s) PTO/SB/02A attached hereto

DECLARATION

ADDITIONAL INVENTOR(S)
Supplemental Sheet
Page 3 of 3

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